Natural Law and the Problem of Divine Action

Continuing Series – Philip Clayton, Adventures in the Spirit, Chapter 12. Transforming Theology Project

The point of this book is becoming clear we enter Part 4,which focuses on whether modern science will allow a place for a divine agency in the universe. In the previous section, Clayton offered an extended exploration of “panentheism,” which he believes is really the only viable option for modern Christians who wish to engage modern science with any degree of success. It’s true that many Christians either compartmentalize the two, or are happy to jettison science all together. But there are others, like Clayton, and like myself, who want to be able to affirm with some degree of respectability both science and faith. While Clayton’s version of panentheism draws upon Process Thought, he modifies it along the way, drawing upon other philosophical and theological traditions.

The primary issue under consideration here is the problem of causation. It’s a problem for theologians because it would appear that natural law – and modern physics – precludes a divine agent (God). Modern science presupposes a closed universe – nothing can penetrate from the outside (no interventionist models of God are allowed). This, however, conflicts with traditional theism, which assumes an interventionist God, a God who still storms and raises the dead. We have faced these past two centuries or so, a major problem with this understanding. Indeed, often we’ve been left with a God of the Gaps, with the gaps being closed left and right. So, the room for God to move is becoming more and more restricted. Therefore, maybe it’s time for a new model or paradigm.

At the heart of the question is the problem of “causal closure,” that is the principle of physics that presupposes that there is a constant amount of energy in the universe. To allow for an interventionist God would mean allowing for an introduction of new energy. So, we’re left with a sense of physical determinism and efficient causes. There is an additional problem – that is the assumption that “only physical things exist” – and God by definition isn’t a physical thing.

Evolution, it is said, requires that no outside causal force can affect the development of more complex systems and life forms. (P. 188).

There have been a number of responses to this claim by evolutionist Christians, but this remains an important challenge. Thus, Clayton suggests that we need a new theory of causation. One possibility is found in quantum physics, with its idea of indeterminacy, but Clayton’s not sure that it leaves enough room for God. Another possibility is that of mental causation – causation happens from within the system. But there are problems here as well.

So, what we need is a model, and Clayton offers one possible solution – in three parts.

1) Begin with the recognition that the natural world provides evidence of a multitude of causes, thus the possibility of a transcendent cause. 2) Recognize that not all causes are mechanistic in nature. 3) But if we broaden the definition of causation, then there may be room for a systematic theory of divine causation.

Quantum physics seems to be both a promising place to work, but it’s not without problems. I must confess that I’m no expert in quantum physics, and what I know is probably gleaned from watching Star Trek, but it would appear that this theory allows for nonphysical causes. In this new paradigm, we move from a very atomistic perspective to one that is holistic – involving a web of relations. I’m still trying to get my head around some of what is being suggested here, but the idea that consciousness may play a role in “creation” is intriguing. Thus, there might be psychological causes, so that the mental has an influence on the physical.

Even theology may offer possibilities – including ideas of divine persuasion or the “double agency” theory of Austin Farrer.

In this view, every action in the world includes a causal role for one or more agents or objects in the world (the “secondary” causes) and a role for God as the “primary” cause of what occurs. (P. 197).

God acts as primary cause not in a coercive way, but by way of divine persuasion. God essentially, acts to guide choices and shape conditions in which decisions are made. This fits with what Clayton thinks is possible – all actions occur as God persuades agents to act or by setting the stage.

Consequently, theists do not need to imagine that God brings about human actions or physical events by divine fiat alone. Divine causality is better understood as a form of causal influence that prepares and persuades. On the one hand, this result makes it much more difficult to conceive a divine influence on rocks or other purely physical systems apart from the laws and initial conditions established by God at creation. On the other hand, it does continue to ascribe to God a crucial causal role in “luring” humanity (and for all we know, perhaps other biological agents as well) and in influencing the interpersonal, moral, intellectual, and aesthetic dimensions of human personhood.” The resulting position emphasizes the genuine openness in history. One cannot know in advance that God will bring about the ends that God desires to accomplish, although one can know that, if God is God, the final state of affairs will be consistent with God’s nature. (P. 198).

Taking all of this evidence into consideration, Clayton wants to offer a coherent theory of emergent causality. Science works with efficient causes – what you can see and test. Divine agency requires the introduction of “formal” or “final” causes. Resources of reintroducing such ideas can be found in such areas as quantum mechanics, mental causes, information theory, and emergence theory. Scientific theory moves from the bottom up, but emergent theory offers room for a “top-down” perspective. That is “the state of the whole – the whole chemical system within which particles interact, the whole cell, the whole organism, the whole ecosystem, the brain as a whole – affects the behavior of the particles and the causal interactions that they have” (p. 201). So, is there a place for the whole influencing the parts – and in that allowing room for divine agency?

The real problem is agency from the outside the system, but what if God is within the system or the system is within God? As we explore this possibility, we need to recognize several issues: 1) Science can’t provide for “final causes,” that’s a metaphysical or theological concern. 2) “the framework of guided emergence is not the same thing as the control of the evolutionary process that traditional theists once defended.” That is, the divine agent doesn’t control the process, but guides it by providing information into the system. It’s more “lure-like” than some form of predestination. 3) Exploration of such “final causes” doesn’t provide for a proof of God’s existence – a la Aquinas’ four proofs. He speaks of his position as one of “‘quasi-purposiveness’ in nature,” rather than some kind of design theory (p. 202).

At this point the purpose has been to demonstrate that “scientific conclusions do not require one to speak of this guidance as mere fiction.” He believes he has accomplished this. He has essentially opened up the door for a rational conversation about divine causation. That is, I think, a good start.